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Whose idea was it anyway? The dynamics of international policy transfer 
and the case of consumption tax reform 
 
 
There are a number of unresolved debates among scholars concerning the nature of policy 
transfer and its implications for policy analysis. For example, scholars of a rational-
functionalist orientation see the exchange of policy knowledge in positive terms – providing 
governments with evidence of the benefits and problems associated with policy 
experiments elsewhere. On the other hand, scholars of a more critical orientation regard 
policy transfer as having the potential to constrain policy choices and privilege structurally 
dominant actors in the policy process. Empirically it would seem that many different 
processes result in policy transfer and that models of policy transfer are best regarded as 
heuristic devices used to guide research into the policy transfer process. This paper employs 
such an approach by using the policy transfer literature to gain insights into the origins of 
one of the most politically contested policy agendas both in Australia and across most 
industrialised nations in recent years – the introduction of VAT-style consumption taxes.1 
 
The paper begins by mapping the proliferation of VAT-style taxes in the final decades of 
the 20th Century. The paper then briefly review the policy transfer literature before using it 
to guide a detail examination of  process of policy transfer that led to the proliferation of  
VATs. The paper concludes by assessing the implications of the VAT case study for both 
theoretical debates within the policy transfer literature and broader debates about the nature 
of the policy process.  
 
Introduction 
The rise of a value-added tax (VAT) is an unparalleled tax phenomenon. 
The history of taxation reveals no other tax that has swept the world in 
some thirty years, from theory to practice, and carried along with it 
academics who were once dismissive and countries that once rejected it 
(Tait 1988 as citied in Ishi 2001, p. 196). 
 
The international proliferation of VATs in the later decades of the 20th century has been 
truly remarkable, perhaps doubly so given the political challenges associated with 
establishing a substantial new tax base. Rather than focus on the politics surrounding 
the enactment and consolidation of broad-based consumption taxes, this paper considers 
the foundational issue of what prompted policy makers to attempt such reforms in the 
first instance and the origins of the indirect tax reform agenda. It begins by documenting 
the proliferation of VAT-style taxes in the last half of the 20th century. After first being 
introduced in France in the early 1950s, 50 years later broad-based consumption taxes 
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with a systematic crediting of tax on inputs represent a significant part of the revenue 
base in all but one OECD country and in 115 transitional and developing nations (Keen 
2005). 
 
In order to improve our understanding of this ‘unparalleled tax phenomenon’ we turn to 
the policy transfer literature which seeks to explain the process through which policy 
innovations spread from one jurisdiction to the next. The goal here is to highlight the 
policy problems which governments were trying to address with new consumption taxes 
and why, of the numerous options, national policy makers almost invariably opted for a 
type of VAT. While the spread of VATs was initially promoted through what is now the 
European Union, by the 1970s there was a growing consensus among public finance 
economists and policy elites that VATs both provided an effective revenue base and had 
the potential to alleviate many of the fiscal problems confronting advanced industrial 
nations at the time. Despite political resistance a process of elite policy transfer occurred 
such that VATs were proposed as an important part of the tax reform agenda in 
industrialised economies in the late 20th century. Yet as John Kingdon (1984) has noted, 
with contested policy issues the political agenda is not shaped by policy elites alone. In 
the first instance political problems are defined by complex political and economic 
forces, while solutions are politically more likely to be promoted if they are aligned 
with prevailing preferences and values. While there has been a tendency in much of the 
literature on policy transfer and economic constructivism more generally to regard 
dominant ideas as auto-legitimating, there are many cases in which society remains 
hostile to elite agendas (Seabrooke 2006). This is certainly true in a highly contested 
policy arena such as taxation. Indeed while there has been a strong general trend 
towards the introduction of VATs in recent decades, it is important to note that 
distinctive national political contexts have resulted in significant variations in how these 
taxes are structured and administered. Overall there has been a process of policy 
emulation in which different countries adopted the idea of a VAT, although with 
variations designed to meet domestic political conditions (Hudson and Lowe 2004, 
p.175). In short, the tax reform agenda in specific countries was shaped by a 
combination of the structural conditions facing the economy, the nature of the policy 
transfer network in the tax policy arena, the political solidarity and autonomy of policy 
elites and the broader process of domestic political legitimation.  
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The paper will describe the proliferation of the VAT, first across Europe and then other 
developed and developing economies. Then using the policy transfer literature as a 
guide it will explore the specific processes that led to the spread of VATs across the 
OECD and beyond. 
 
Charting the global proliferation of VATs 
Taxation is as old as government and in ancient times practical considerations such as 
ease of collection and administration took precedence over the more abstract aims that 
dominate contemporary tax debates. Adams (1982) reports that the Egyptians imposed 
general sales taxes at major markets, while in the early Roman Republic Caligula was 
exalted for abolishing the general sales tax in AD 40. Excises and tariffs were the 
mainstay of tax systems during mercantilist times and it was not until the early 20th 
century that governments imposed more coherent and comprehensive sales and income 
taxes to fund their rapidly expanding activities. Ironically VATs, with their aim of 
taxing the value added at each stage of the production process, actually had their origins 
in the United States in the 1920s where national economic statistics were more 
comprehensive than other countries (Lindholm 1980; Steinmo 1993, p. 94; Wells and 
Flesher 1999).2 If national economic activity could be accurately measured influential 
tax experts such as T.S. Adams, who drafted the Federal income tax legislation of 1913, 
argued that the most efficient form of business taxation would be a small uniform tax on 
each stage of the production process (Wells and Flesher 1999). Adams and other 
proponents of VATs continued to have some influence on the US tax policy up to and 
during World War Two when Senator Joseph O’Mahoney of Wyoming unsuccessfully 
introduced VAT legislation into the Congress in an effort to finance the war effort 
(Lindholm 1984). 
 
Interest among US tax experts in VATs resulted in the world’s first legislation for a 
staged consumption tax being enacted in another country where consumption taxes have 
evoked a great deal of controversy; Japan. In the aftermath of the Second World War 
Japan’s public finances were in a state of disarray prompting the Allied powers to 
initiate a comprehensive review of the Japanese tax system conducted by American tax 
experts led by Professor Carl Shoup (Ishi 2001, pp. 25-56). It was the Shoup Mission, 
completed in August 1949, that recommended the introduction of a VAT style tax at a 
rate of between four and six per cent at the Prefecture level to replace existing business 
taxes. While the VAT legislation was enacted the implementation of the tax was 
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postponed several times, before finally being abandoned in 1953. (Ishi 2001, pp. 272-
274; Shoup 1989). 
 
Despite its American origins the first modern VAT was introduced in France on 10 
April 1954, although it must be noted that the tax only applied up to a wholesale level 
(Wells and Flesher 1999; Ebrill et al 2001, p. 4). While the French VAT certainly 
proved to be an efficient and effective tax base the structural development which served 
as a catalyst for the diffusion of VATs across Europe was the formation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) as a result of the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The driving 
philosophy behind the EEC was to promote economic integration between member 
states. In terms of taxation the original Charter sought to achieve the harmonisation of 
indirect taxes across the Economic Community in the hope of promoting cross border 
trade and commerce. The type of sales tax that would become the European norm was 
decided by the Neumark Report of 1963 (Neumark Report, 1963). At the time there was 
general support for a staged consumption tax because many European countries already 
used a turnover-tax style of consumption tax, which although effective in raising 
revenue artificially discriminated against multiple-stage production processes (Sandford 
2001, p. 77). The solution advanced by the Neumark Report was that all member 
countries should introduce identical VATs by 1 January 1970, owing to the tax’s 
technical superiority (Schiff 1973; Kato 2003, p. 41). While this arguably amounts to a 
form of indirect coercive transfer in that the Neumark Report and subsequent directives 
created an expectation that member states would introduce identical VATs, it is 
important to note that these Commission directives were not binding (Dolowitz and 
Marsh 1996). In fact while EEC members did adopt VATs member states chose to vary 
the VAT rate depending on political pressures and their fiscal needs. This policy 
discretion was later formalised in 1987 with the European Commission (EC) allowing 
member countries to set their ‘standard’ VAT between 14 per cent and 20 per cent, 
while discount rates were to be between four per cent and nine per cent (Kato 2003, p. 
54). The ‘first wave’ of European countries to introduce VATs are listed in Table 1 
(below). 
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Country Adoption Date Original VAT Rate 
Denmark July 1967 10% 
France January 1968 13.6% 
Germany (West)  January 1968 10% 
Netherlands January 1969 12% 
Sweden January 1969 11.1% 
Norway January 1970 20% 
Luxembourg January 1970 8%  
Ireland January 1972 16.37%  
Italy January 1973 12%  
Austria January 1973 16%  
United Kingdom  April 1973 10% 
 
Table 1.‘First Wave’ of European Countries to introduce a VAT. Source:  Sandford 
2000, p. 78; Wells and Flesher 1999; Ebrill et al 2001. 
 
With a foothold in the EC VATs spread to all parts of the globe. By 1988 Alan Tait of 
the IMF calculated that 59 countries had introduced a pure or partially modified VAT 
tax at a national level (Tait 1988). Sandford calculated that by the late 1990s over 100 
countries used VAT systems, leading to the conclusion that ‘Value added tax is 
probably unique in fiscal history. A generation ago it was virtually unknown. Now it is 
approaching universal.’ (Sandford 2001, p. 77). This trend continues unabated and as of 
2004 29 of 30 OECD member countries had introduced VAT style taxes at a national 
level (the exception being the United States) (OECD 2004) and 135 countries globally 
use the tax as a major source of revenue (Keen 2005).  
 
Beyond the sheer number of countries having established a VAT base many 
governments have subsequently increased VAT rates contributing to a general trend 
away from direct income taxes to consumption taxes. The OECD reports that between 
1965 and 2000 the share of general consumption taxes as a percentage of GNP for 
member countries has almost doubled from 3.8 per cent to 6.8 per cent and remains 
relatively steady at this level in the new century (OECD 2005, p.20).  
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Understanding policy transfer 
Thus far we have documented the rapid spread of VAT taxes in the second half of the 
twentieth century. What are less clear are the political and economic processes which 
led to this proliferation of consumption taxes. Was the spread of VATs documented 
above the result of increasing economic competition in the international political 
economy – the ‘race to the bottom’, or perhaps the need to fund increasing budget 
deficits? Alternatively, was it a consequence of policymakers’ ‘rational’ decision that 
the introduction of VATs was in their respective countries’ best interest? Did other 
processes and mechanisms influence the transfer of VATs? Understanding the dynamics 
of policy transfer is central to policy analysis because despite a tendency in some 
sections of the public policy literature to treat the agenda setting and decision making 
phases of the policy process as separate (May and Wildavsky 1978), in reality the forces 
driving the policy agenda have a significant impact on policy outcomes. For example 
structural change such as the stagflation of the 1970s not only exposed deficiencies in 
national tax systems but also transformed prevailing ideas and interests in relation to 
taxation policy. Given increasing evidence of policy transfer in recent decades, a 
specific literature has evolved which seeks to better understand this process and its 
implications. Using this literature as a guide the remainder of the paper will explore the 
dynamics of VAT transfer with a view to furthering our understanding of the origins of 
the consumption tax reform agenda. 
 
The empirical evidence on the spread of VATs outlined above amounts to a prima facie 
case of policy transfer, a phenomenon which can be defined as: 
 
a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative 
arrangements, institutions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the 
development of policies, administrative arrangements and institutions 
in another time or place (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996, p. 344). 
 
While early research on policy transfer focused on the diffusion of policies between 
sub-national governments (Walker 1969) more recent studies have tended to concentrate 
on the dynamics of international policy transfer. A second feature of early accounts was 
a tendency to adopt a rationalistic view of the policy process. Policy transfer resulted 
when policy makers systematically evaluated experiences in other jurisdictions in the 
search for ‘optimal’ policy solutions (Rose 1991). The normative implication here is 
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that the voluntaristic adoption of policies from abroad was regarded as ‘opening up’ the 
policy agenda rather than constraining policy choice. Such depictions of the transfer 
process were called into question in an influential review article by Dolowitz and Marsh 
(1996). They argued that rationalist accounts tend to overlook cases of coercive transfer, 
or more subtle cases where underlying structural forces may influence the process of 
problem definition and costs or benefits of various policy options (Howlett and Ramesh 
1996, p. 121). Such arguments seem particularly relevant in an era of increasing 
economic internationalisation in which inter-state competition creates incentives for 
policy makers to develop internationally competitive regulatory regimes (James and 
Lodge 2003, p. 7). Indeed it has been argued that tax competition between countries has 
been an important driver of reduction in statutory capital tax rates in recent years 
(Swank 2002; Ganghof and Eccleston 2004). 
 
Despite the significance of structural factors in shaping the context in which policy 
transfer occurs there, is ample evidence that domestic politics and individual actors also 
influence the transfer process. For example while structural accounts of policy transfer 
tend to imply policy convergence, as the considerable revisionist literature on 
globalisation points out there has been significant variation in both the timing and 
content of economic reforms generally and tax reforms specifically in recent years 
(Sandford 2001; Swank 2002 ch. 7). So while structural developments increase the 
opportunities and incentives for transfer the process also requires the engagement of 
active agents. This is the central claim of Evans and Davies’ (1999) model of policy 
transfer which provides a clear framework to assess the dynamics of VAT transfer in 
recent decades. 
 
Evans and Davies (1999) argue that many models of policy transfer are compromised 
by the fact that they define the transfer process too broadly. They rightly point out that 
very few policies are truly innovative – aspects of almost all programs draw on past 
experience to some extent (1999, p. 367). In other cases policy makers in different 
jurisdictions might quite independently decide on similar policy responses to common 
political problems without any transfer taking place (Peters 1997). In view of such 
criticisms the important question on which models of policy transfer should focus is: 
how do the specific mechanics of policy transfer shape the policy agenda and 
outcomes? This implies a two-pronged approach to research.  
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Firstly, building on the argument advanced by Dolwitz and Marsh (1996), Evans and 
Davies argue that ‘it is crucial that we place social and political action within the 
structural context in which it takes place’ (1999, p. 370). We need to consider the 
underlying economic, social and ideational forces driving the transfer process. While 
context is important they stress that we can only assess the influence of policy transfer 
on decision making if we also focus on the actors who are the agents of transfer – their 
motivations and their impact on the policy process. The aim here is to differentiate 
intentional transfer, where one group of actors consciously engages with elites from 
another jurisdiction as part of the policy process, from less clearly defined instances in 
which one country mimics the policy initiatives of others for unknown reasons. This 
second point demands a clear focus on what Evans and Davies define as policy transfer 
networks or ‘ad hoc action-oriented phenomena set up with the specific intention of 
engineering policy change.’(1999, p.376). 
 
Methodologically this approach, with its dual focus on both the actors involved in 
policy transfer and the structural context in which they are situated, draws on 
structuration theory – the notion that agents and structures are conceptually separate yet 
mutually constitutive. The framework implies that consideration needs to be given to 
the economic, institutional and ideational context in which transfer takes place and how 
this context influences the motivations and resources of actors in transfer networks. At 
the micro-level we need to assess how situated actors actually influence the policy 
agenda. In practical terms if we are to develop an appreciation of how policy transfer as 
conceived by Evans and Davis influenced the proliferation of VATs in the second half 
of the 20th Century, we need to explore three distinct aspects of the process.  
 
Firstly we need to understand the structural context in which transfer occurred. In the 
case at hand this requires documenting how the economic and ideational context 
changed from the 1970s. The next section of the paper will outline the structural drivers 
of the international shift towards VATs. The sustained high levels of economic growth 
associated with the post-war boom and buoyant revenue flows that resulted presented 
few reasons to reform national tax systems. However the economic crisis of the 1970s 
forced policy makers to restructure national tax systems (Boskin and McLure 1990). 
Beyond the economic imperatives of reining in rampant budget deficits and attempting 
to enhance economic competitiveness, the recession of the 1970s also precipitated a 
paradigm shift in macroeconomic policy making (Hall 1993). In terms of tax policy 
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traditional aims of using tax systems to redistribute wealth and promote specific types 
of investment were gradually displaced by a new public finance orthodoxy which 
argued that tax systems should be neutral in their economic impact and should 
encourage economic growth by minimising marginal tax rates on capital and wage 
income (Steinmo 2003). 
 
Secondly while the economic and ideational shifts highlighted above acted as catalysts 
for reform the shift towards VATs experienced in the final decades of the 20th century 
was by no means inevitable. In order to understand the origins of the consumption tax 
reform agenda we need to follow the lead of Evans and Davies (1999) and identify the 
policy entrepreneurs who formulated VAT proposals and the mechanisms through 
which this reform agenda was transferred between countries. We shall see how the 
structural developments outlined above resulted in a fundamental shift in the way public 
finance experts viewed consumption taxes. This contributed to a new consensus that 
increasing the relative importance of consumption taxes would result in a more stable 
and efficient tax base, and that of the many forms of broad-based consumption taxes a 
staged VAT was the most desirable. Having outlined these debates among public 
finance experts we then describe the process which resulted in the transfer of these ideas 
to policy makers across the industrialised world and beyond. 
  
With the seeds of the VAT agenda sown in the minds of policy-making elites across the 
globe, the final task of the paper is to outline some of the domestic political and 
economic conditions that are required for the uptake of the consumption tax agenda. 
The international experience suggests that consumption tax reform evolved from being 
a policy option favoured by policy elites to a mainstream agenda item when there was 
an acute political awareness of structural problems confronting the tax system of the 
country concerned. For example large budget deficits, popular discontent with the 
fairness of the prevailing system, and/or high personal income tax rates have historically 
created windows of opportunity for enterprising policy entrepreneurs or politicians to 
advocate a VAT as the policy solution to the acute problems facing national tax 
systems. In short this paper will outline how a combination of structural factors, the 
actions of policy elites and specific windows of political opportunity explain why at 
different times VATs have gained prominence on the political agendas of the vast 
majority of nations over the past three decades.  
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Whilst this paper focuses on the proliferation of VATs across the OECD, it is important 
to note that consumption taxes have also become one of the most important tax 
instruments in transitional and developing countries. According to the IMF in 2001 
VATs raised $18 trillion annually, accounting for almost a quarter of global taxation. 
Considering such figures there is little wonder that senior economists in the Fund’s 
Fiscal Affairs division concluded that ‘The VAT is probably the most important tax 
development in the latter part of the twentieth century, and certainly the most 
breathtaking.’ (Ebill et al 2001, p. 1). We now turn our attention to explaining this 
‘breathtaking’ phenomenon.  
 
 
Policy transfer in the case of the VAT: Structural pre-conditions 
The initial decision by the EC to adopt a value-added tax as the European norm was the 
result of policy elites (in the Neumark Report of 1962) deciding that a VAT represented 
an incremental improvement on established and largely successful turnover taxes. 
However the spread of VATs from the EC across the OECD and beyond was driven by 
structural developments, or in the words of Boskins (1990, p.3): ‘This extraordinary 
series of tax reforms occurred in response to intellectual, historical and political currents 
that appeared in the 1970s.’  
 
Prior to this period of macroeconomic upheaval the stability of the post-war period 
underpinned a strong consensus on the broad parameters of taxation policy. While 
policy settings and instruments varied from country to country there was general 
agreement that the Keynesian welfare state should be funded by progressive income 
taxes and relatively high rates of taxation on capital, albeit with numerous concessions 
aimed at promoting industrial investment (Swank and Steinmo 2003). This post-war tax 
paradigm had strong foundations. The redistributive aspects of progressive taxation 
stimulated aggregate demand, while the concessional taxation of capital was the 
cornerstone of an important class compromise which underpinned the political stability 
of the post-war period (Steinmo 1993). Most importantly the legitimacy of the 
Keynesian paradigm and the associated commitment to progressive taxation was 
sustained by the ongoing economic prosperity experienced under the policy regime 
(Hall 1993; Steinmo 2003). 
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Yet as Steinmo (2003) points out dominant ideas about tax policy evolve in response to 
changing economic circumstances and the political pressures associated with such 
events. In reality a complex combination of factors undermined the Keynesian 
consensus. By the mid-1970s the onset of stagflation and a global recession called into 
question whether governments could actively manage the economy. With the credibility 
of Keynesian economic management increasingly being called into question, policy 
elites backed by powerful financial interests promoted neo-liberalism as the new 
macroeconomic orthodoxy (Hall 1993). This policy paradigm shift effectively 
established new intellectual terrain in which tax policy would be debated (Boskins 
1990; Hallerberg and Basinger 1998). Whereas policy makers in the 1950s and 1960s 
had regarded progressive taxation and tax expenditures as effective tools of economic 
management and an efficient means to fund the welfare state, a decade later a new 
public finance orthodoxy was emerging.  
 
At the broadest level the economic crisis of the 1970s called into question the logic and 
effectiveness of active state intervention in the economy. In the tax policy arena there 
was growing consensus that high marginal tax rates and the proliferation of tax 
concessions and investment incentives were seriously distorting economic activity and 
contributing to the general economic malaise (Browning 1978). By the mid-1970s there 
was a consensus among public finance experts that there were clearly defined structural 
problems with taxation systems across the OECD. In keeping with neo-liberal theory it 
was argued that tax systems should be reformed to improve their neutrality so that 
market forces, rather than the intricacies of the tax code and the political compromises 
they embodied, dictated patterns of investment and consumption (McLure 1984; 
Steinmo 2003; Swank 2003).  
 
Not only did the economic crisis of the 1970s result in a policy paradigm shift which led 
tax experts to advocate more market-conforming tax systems, but the subsequent 
recessions and associated budget deficits meant that governments had to achieve 
reforms without compromising revenues. These structural pressures forced policy 
makers to explore and expand new tax bases. In short the economic conditions of the 
1970s and the increasingly liberalised and competitive international political economy 
that resulted created structural conditions that favoured a policy shift from income taxes 
to neutral consumption taxes, including broad-based VAT consumption taxes. 
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According to proponents of broad-based consumption taxes they offered the following 
advantages: 
 
o If levied on a broad base, VATs would not distort patterns of savings and 
investment. 
o If used to fund reductions to income taxes on capital and labour VATs would 
improve incentives to work and invest. 
o Relative to taxes on income, VATs encourage savings, thus improving domestic 
capital formation. 
o VATs can be levied on services (which represent an increasing proportion of 
consumption in a post-industrial society) as well as tangible consumer products. 
o Exports can be ‘zero rated’ improving trade competitiveness. 
o The revenue yield is less volatile across the business cycle relative to income 
taxes. (Tait 1988; Ebrill et al 2001) 
 
In summary the end of the post-war boom and the policy paradigm shift that resulted led 
to a fundamental reassessment of the manner in which governments could and should 
raise revenue. By the 1970s there was a strongly held view among policy elites that tax 
systems should be designed in a market-conforming manner. Indeed Ganghof (2005, p. 
78) argues that the tax reform movement of the period was ‘a textbook case of how 
powerful ideas, supported by particular countries and international organisations, spread 
around the world.’ More specifically while many reforms concentrated on broadening 
the income tax base and lowering income tax rates there was a growing acceptance that 
broad-based VAT taxes were consistent with these goals and should become a more 
prominent part of the tax mix. Clearly the structural factors described above undermined 
the post-war tax policy status quo and created the pre-conditions for the diffusion of 
VATs beyond the EC. However this diffusion process was by no means inevitable and 
the fact that there was significant variation in the timing and content of reforms across 
the OECD suggests that both the mechanisms of policy transfer and the prevailing 
political conditions in recipient countries influenced the transfer process. 
 
Agents in the transfer processes 
A central contention of the contemporary literature on policy transfer is the importance 
of actors in the dissemination of policy ideas and how values held by policy elites, and 
the manner in which they engage with colleagues in international organisations, 
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influence the transfer process (Evans and Davis 1999, p. 363). An actor-orientated 
approach not only allows us to distinguish between policy transfer and mere 
coincidental mimicry, but through identifying transfer agents and establishing their 
motivations and the manner in which they interact we can enhance our understanding of 
the factors that drive, and the variables that mediate, the transfer process. This emphasis 
on transfer networks is particularly relevant to the diffusion of tax reform proposals in 
the late 20th century where ideas about tax reform were exchanged by high-ranking 
Treasury and Finance officials at the OECD, IMF and other international forums 
(Ganghof 2005; Swank 2003).3 
 
The OECD was established in 1961 to promote economic development, world trade and 
financial stability (Molle, 2003, p. 121). While the OECD avoids an advocacy role and 
regards itself as a ‘clearing-house’ for economic and policy data for the use of member 
governments, in many policy arenas, including taxation policy, the Organisation has 
played a pivotal role in disseminating specific policy agendas. In a recent (2005) 
address to the US President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform the OECD’s chief of Tax 
Policy and Administration, Jeffrey Owens, acknowledged that the ‘OECD’s main 
functions are to encourage countries to share their experiences, develop best practices 
and set international standards’(OECD 2005). The influence of the OECD is heightened 
by its ‘working party’ structure in which research and report writing is conducted by 
seconded experts from member countries rather than a professional staff (Fratianni and 
Pattison 2000). Such an approach gives member countries ‘ownership’ of OECD 
research, while senior officials returning from the OECD to their home agencies serve 
as powerful personal conduits of economic ideas. Indeed because senior OECD officials 
are situated at the intersection of a number of national-level policy networks they 
possess a unique and privileged position to drive policy and institutional change 
(Clemens and Cook 1999; Pierson 2004, 137) When combined with member countries’ 
commitment to unanimously supporting published research the OECD represents a 
powerful forum to develop common positions on economic policy issues as well as an 
influential network for policy professionals. In this sense the OECD is widely regarded 
as enhancing the international exchange of policy expertise (Rose 1991, p. 105).  
 
The IMF while traditionally focusing its economic policy advice on debtor nations has, 
through its staunch advocacy of fiscal reform, also had a broader impact on the policy 
transfer process. The Fund has long been a firm advocate of broad-based consumption 
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taxes, recommending such taxes in their technical assistance to transitional and 
developing nations and commending their introduction in OECD economies. Indeed 
according to the IMF an ideal tax system should feature a ‘heavy reliance on a broadly-
based sales tax, such as a value-added tax, preferably with a single rate and minimal 
exemptions, and excise taxes levied on petroleum products, alcohol, tobacco and a few 
items that are considered luxuries.’ (as quoted in McBride 2005). Such advice has 
resulted in ‘half of all countries which have introduced a VAT during the last twenty 
years [making] use of FAD (The IMF Fiscal Affairs Department) advice’ (Ebrill et al 
2001, p. xi). In addition to such direct advice the IMF generally and senior economists 
in the Fiscal Affairs Departments have also published widely both on the merits of a 
VAT and how to best to implement and administer the tax (Tait 1988; Ebrill et al 2001). 
Finally increasing economic liberalisation and the associated potential for tax 
competition has led to the creation of new international forums such as the International 
Tax Dialogue designed to encourage discussion between policy experts and the sharing 
of good tax policy.4  
 
In the tax policy arena it can be argued that the OECD, IMF and associated forums have 
served as the basis for an international epistemic community or a ‘network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a policy particular domain’ 
(Haas 1992, p. 2). Haas argues that policy making in the late 20th century has been 
influenced by increasing complexity and interdependence on one hand, and the 
increasing prominence and influence of bureaucratic policy experts on the other. In this 
context policy knowledge and expertise is an important power resource, capable of 
defining policy problems and framing possible alternatives. In order to achieve such 
influence members of an epistemic community need to possess a common professional 
culture, norms in relation to their policy objectives, and shared causal beliefs (1992, p. 
3). Indeed Pierson (2004, p. 104) has recently argued that policy transfer has a strong 
sociological basis with international policy ‘fads’ being shaped more by what elites 
regard as being appropriate than any objective policy analysis. 
 
Examination of the role of international agencies in the global tax reform movement 
suggests they have acted as a node for a global epistemic community playing a pivotal 
role in the policy transfer process. Firstly, as outlined above, OECD and IMF research 
staff are predominantly seconded from member countries’ central finance and budget 
agencies, increasing the likelihood that staff hold similar world views. Secondly the fact 
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that researchers are senior officials from the central economic agencies of member 
countries promotes a common professional culture and shared causal beliefs. In 
summary the OECD, IMF and their specific Committee structures such as the OECD 
Committee on Fiscal Affairs (established in 1971) and the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs 
Department provide tangible institutional structures which increase the opportunities for 
policy transfer. While there is general evidence that international agencies are the loci of 
policy transfer in the tax policy arena (Sandford 2001, p. 77; Tanzi 1987), we need to 
look to specific case studies in order to understand how policy ideas filtered through 
epistemic communities to influence the policy agenda across the OECD (Evans and 
Davis 1999, p. 317). 
 
In Australia the ‘modern’ tax reform agenda was effectively established by the Asprey 
Committee of Inquiry (1975) which was notable for strongly advocating the 
introduction of a VAT tax despite little community support for the tax (Eccleston 2004). 
The fact that Inquiry insiders highlighted the influence of Treasury Officials and their 
strong advocacy of the introduction VATs along the lines of the tax that existed in the 
EEC and had been recommended by the OECD (Treasury 1973), amounts to prima 
facie evidence in the Australian case of public officials using their professional 
expertise and positions of authority to act as agents of policy transfer (Asprey 1974, pp. 
6-8; Wallace 1976, p. 80; Thompson 1976). While historical accounts of the activities 
of individual public officials are scarce there is also strong evidence of the 
dissemination of OECD research on consumption taxes in Canada and Japan. In the 
Japanese case the Ministry of Finance’s long standing interest in the introduction of a 
VAT as a means to stabilise public finances has been attributed in part to VAT study 
exchanges between Japan and EC in the early 1970s, which led to the Government Tax 
System Research Council’s 1971 proposal to introduce a VAT (Kato 1994, pp. 112-113; 
Wright 2002, p. 239). Similarly in Canada Hale (2002, pp. 207-209) notes that Ministry 
of Finance officials such as the influential Douglas Hartle were the main proponents of 
a national VAT in the agenda-setting Carter Commission Report of 1967. More recently 
Steinmo (2003, pp. 18-19) obtained further evidence of converging elite opinion when 
he interviewed senior finance ministry officials from OECD countries as diverse as 
Japan, Sweden and Australia and found remarkably similar tax policy preferences and 
reform priorities. Such evidence points to the existence of an international epistemic 
community of senior economic policy officials based around the OECD and other 
international forums which served as the basis of a policy transfer network. Moreover 
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the prominent position occupied by these powerful bureaucrats in the central economic 
agencies ensured their considerable influence over the tax reform agenda in their 
respective countries.  
 
However this is not to say that the transfer process was inevitable or automatic. As we 
shall see below, while the transfer networks outlined above ensured that VATs were 
high on the policy agenda of state elites, such proposals had to be linked to specific 
political problems before politicians would be prepared to risk promoting such 
controversial taxes. We now examine the domestic political and economic conditions 
required for consumption tax proposals to move from being a reform possibility to 
assuming a prominent position in the national decision agenda. 
 
Domestic Politics and Policy Windows 
In his influential analysis of the agenda setting process John Kingdon (1984) 
highlighted an important distinction between the policy stream, or the policy proposals 
and solutions which experts promote, and the broader political pressures and policy 
problems confronting governments. Thus far we have focused our analysis on the 
circumstances and processes which have led policy elites and senior officials in central 
economic agencies to change their tax policy priorities. However Kingdon argues that 
for a policy issue to make the transition from being on the governmental agenda or the 
extensive list of policies to which insiders and policy experts give consideration, to a 
government’s decision agenda or the small number of priority issues which the political 
executive actively promote, requires an alignment of policy options with perceived 
political problems.  
 
Kingdon’s framework is significant because it emphasises that both domestic political 
circumstances and elite opinion influence the overt political agenda. A number of 
scholars have built upon this model by exploring the dynamics of ‘problem definition’ 
and the circumstances that influence demands for new policies (Anderson 2000). Some 
scholars argue that the political context in the form of prevailing policy ideas and 
material interests shape the overt decision agenda and that political problems can be 
objectively defined (for a summary see Wood and Vedlitz 2005), while others of a 
constructivist orientation highlight the contingent influence of culture, norms and 
discourse in shaping interests and defining policy problems (Kuran 1995; Stone 1997).  
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Beyond the debate about how political problems come to be defined there is a general 
agreement that in the tax policy arena governments are reluctant to promote significant 
tax reform in the absence of widely held perceptions that the policy status quo is 
unsustainable. It was only when the costs of policy inaction outweighed the risks of 
reform that the tax reform movement gathered momentum in the 1980s. In Kingdon’s 
terms there needs to be an alignment of the policy (expert advice) and political streams. 
So while new tax policy initiatives may capture the imagination of senior bureaucrats in 
Treasury and Finance Departments political leaders are unlikely to risk promoting 
reforms until there is political support for such proposals.5  
 
The politics of taxation literature provides important insights into the domestic 
circumstances under which tax reform proposals make the transition from the 
governmental agenda to the decision agenda. It seems that a combination of domestic 
economic factors and broad societal attitudes towards the prevailing tax system create 
windows of opportunity for bureaucratic elites and policy entrepreneurs to promote tax 
reform (Hallerberg and Basinger 1998). Firstly it will come as no surprise that in an era 
when economic and financial issues dominate both the media and political debate 
changing economic conditions influence community perceptions of the need for 
economic reform. This is especially true in times of recession and fiscal crises which in 
turn create circumstances in which politicians and policy entrepreneurs can credibly 
argue that the policy status quo is untenable and that comprehensive reform is 
necessary. For example with neo-liberalism firmly entrenched as the economic 
orthodoxy, since the 1970s deteriorating public finances have been presented as an 
acute policy problem that has served as a catalyst for tax reform (Steinmo and Swank 
2002; Swank 2004).6 Hallerberg and Basinger (1998) also provide clear evidence that 
governments presiding over low growth economies are more likely to engage in tax 
reform in an attempt to stimulate the economy. More subtly, as we shall see in our case 
studies, advocates of consumption tax reform have used related economic arguments 
such as the need to improve national savings and export competitiveness to undermine 
the policy status quo. While policy ‘problems’ are socially constructed and influenced 
by prevailing ideas in relation to economic governance (Howlette and Ramesh 1995; 
Wood and Vedlitz 2005), it nonetheless seems that when economic performance 
deviates from parameters acceptable under the prevailing orthodoxy, the electorate will 
accept and may even expect corrective policy action.  
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A second set of domestic issues that provides a window of opportunity for tax reform is 
provided when the legitimacy and effectiveness of the existing tax system is called into 
question. We have already noted the coercive nature of taxation. Indeed effective tax 
systems are backed by a range of sanctions to encourage compliance. However in order 
for a tax system to be sustainable it must be regarded as legitimate and fair by the vast 
majority of taxpayers (Levi 1988; Braithwaite 2005). Given the scope of modern tax 
systems the state can’t possibly force compliance or enforce the tax code in more than a 
small minority of cases (Mann 1993; Hobson 2000, pp. 199-201). Instead the state must 
rely upon what Levi (1988) refers to as quasi-voluntary compliance, a situation in which 
the vast majority of taxpayers choose to pay tax because they regard the tax system and 
the public expenditure that it funds as being legitimate. However when there are widely 
held perceptions that the tax system is arbitrary and unfair and that significant segments 
of the community are evading their tax obligations, a rapid decline in taxpayer morality 
(and revenues) may follow. As Steinmo points out (2003) such circumstances have the 
potential to trigger mass dissatisfaction with the tax system creating an acute policy 
problem for government and pushing tax reform to centre stage as a political issue. 
Perhaps the best example of such a back lash was the popular opposition to the Thatcher 
government’s poll tax in early 1990s which culminated in the abolition of the loathed 
tax (King 1993). Similarly in Australia in the early 1970s increasing publicity of 
rampant tax avoidance by the rich while wage earners were facing increasing tax 
burdens acted as a catalyst for a Commission of Inquiry into the tax system 
(Groenewegen 1982, p. 7). In the United States growing awareness of the abuse of tax 
expenditures contributed to the momentum of the tax reform movement (Surrey 1973). 
 
In summary we can conclude that tax reform generally and consumption tax proposals 
in particular seem to achieve political prominence when policy elites are in agreement 
about the goals of tax reform and there is also a wider political acceptance that there are 
significant problems with the tax policy status quo. This analysis conforms closely with 
Kingdon’s view that windows of opportunity for agenda setting occur when policy 
proposals are linked with acute political problems. However it is important to recognise 
that policy problems and associated solutions are socially constructed and critically 
dependent on how actors interpret their context (Seidman and Rappaport 1986). While 
policy opportunities are influenced by the interaction of structural forces and prevailing 
ideas there is widespread agreement that actors play an important role both in promoting 
ideas within policy communities (as Evans and Davies (1999) suggest) and in linking 
  
20
proposals to the political problems confronting government leaders. In short actors and 
policy entrepreneurs in particular play a vital role in capitalising on windows of 
opportunity in the policy process.  
 
For example Kingdon stresses that agenda setting is the product both of structural 
processes and of autonomous participants. Central here are: 
 
Policy entrepreneurs, people who…. are responsible not only for 
prompting important people to pay attention, but also for coupling 
solutions to problems and for coupling both problems and solutions to 
politics (Kingdon 1984, p. 21). 
 
Often the most effective policy entrepreneurs are located outside the state, and by 
reinforcing formal bureaucratic advice they prompt political decision makers within 
government to take decisive action. It is in this role that many analysts believe that think 
tanks have their greatest influence over the policy process (Kingdon 1984; Abelson 
2002). Similarly Campbell argues that entrepreneurs with diverse backgrounds and 
experiences are valuable because they may offer innovative solutions and can lend 
political legitimacy to a policy proposal (Campbell 2004, p. 178). This seemed to be the 
case in Australia in 1997 when a cross-class coalition of state elites, business leaders 
and welfare activists convinced Prime Minister Howard to reintroduce a VAT proposal 
onto the national political agenda despite the fact that he had given a very public 
assurance that he would not introduce such a tax (Eccleston 2000, Bell 2006). A second 
set of actors that has been increasingly important in the ‘market place of economic 
ideas’ is the financial press. Hall (1993, p. 288) notes that in many of the economic 
policy debates of the late 20th century, not only has the media reported policy views 
held by economic and financial experts, but the financial press has actively advocated 
certain policy views and thus is an important political actor in terms of defining policy 
problems and proposing policy solutions. 
 
If an innovative policy idea is going to achieve prominence on the overt political agenda 
it must be endorsed by a critical mass of authoritative policy elites. In the case of 
economic policy making these elites are often senior officials in key economic policy 
making agencies. However as Kingdon (1984) highlighted over two decades ago, for an 
idea to move from the realm of elite consideration to the mainstream policy agenda the 
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policy program in question must be able to address a defined policy problem and be 
acceptable to the voting public. While we have seen that there has been a high degree of 
international agreement among policy elites in terms of the merits of introducing VATs, 
this convergence of preferences has been tempered by differing economic and fiscal 
conditions experienced in specific countries. Such cross-national variation in the onset 
of budget deficits and other administrative problems associated with national tax 
systems has meant that the domestic circumstances conducive to promoting a VAT have 
varied from country to country. Similarly, and as will be explored in more detail in our 
case studies, variations in political conditions in specific countries have resulted in 
policy makers tailoring the VAT proposals to suit domestic political imperatives and 
minimise electoral opposition. As Radaelli has observed, while there has been 
significant cognitive convergence on issues of tax reform, domestic political 
circumstances have a powerful mediating effect on the transfer process. 
 
No tax system has been 'diffused' from one country to others, athough 
among policy-makers there has been a process of cognitive convergence 
around certain paradigms and fiscal emergencies (2000, p. 29). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has outlined the origins of the VAT agenda which swept the world in the 
final decades of the 20th Century. In keeping with the contemporary literature on policy 
transfer I have argued that a combination of structural conditions such as the economic 
crisis of the 1970s and changing ideas about taxation policy created circumstances 
conducive for fundamental tax reform. However the changing structural context in 
which tax policy was being made over the period only provided the pre-conditions for 
the global proliferation of VATs. Indeed a cursory examination of the public finance 
literature in the 1970s reveals a number of credible alternative policy solutions to a 
VAT.7  
 
In order to understand why VATs became an important element of the tax reform 
movement of the last quarter of the Twentieth Century we turned to the policy transfer 
literature. A central claim here is that the process through which policy ideas are 
exchanged has a significant impact on the extent of policy transfer. The dynamics of 
VAT transfer supports such claims in that, after early successful experimentation in the 
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EC, the VAT became the consumption tax of choice among tax policy elites. The spread 
of the VAT across the industrialised and the developing world was then accelerated by 
the existence of an epistemic community, or what Evans and Davis call a policy transfer 
network based around the OECD, IMF and other associated international economic 
forums. Indeed the transfer of the VAT to member countries was expedited by the fact 
that members of this transfer network were drawn from senior officials in central 
economic policy making agencies in the recipient countries. Not only did these 
bureaucrats have policy expertise, they were also in positions of unrivalled authority 
with respect to providing policy advice. At this level the evidence suggests that the 
dynamics of policy transfer did have a discernable impact on the proliferation of VATs 
(James and Lodge 2003). 
 
An interesting exception to this pattern is the United States – the one OECD country 
that does not have a VAT. It seems that the American political system features a much 
more open marketplace for economic advice in which state officials do not enjoy the 
monopoly powers which they do in other countries. In such an institutional setting it has 
been more difficult to present a VAT as a preferred solution to American fiscal 
problems. 
 
Despite an emerging elite consensus on the merits of VATs it is important to note that 
there has been considerable variation in terms of when VATs were introduced and the 
rates at which they have been levied as well as the manner in which they have been 
administered. In terms of the policy transfer literature this amounts to a case of policy 
‘emulation’ in which policy ideas, rather than specific policy settings, have been 
transferred from one jurisdiction to another (Hudson and Lowe 2004; Radaelli 2000, p. 
33; Rose 1991, p. 132). This cross-national variation can be explained in terms of 
Kingdon’s (1984) policy streams framework. The argument here is that while the 
process of elite policy transfer ensured that VATs held a prominent position on the 
decision agenda in the majority of countries, political leaders were generally not willing 
to risk promoting comprehensive tax reform in the absence of widely recognised 
problems with the existing tax system. Even when problems were apparent the VAT 
had to be presented as a credible solution. In short domestic political and economic 
circumstance combined with the actions of policy entrepreneurs to influence when VAT 
proposals make the transition onto the overt political agenda. 
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1 While Australia’s national VAT is called the GST (Goods and Services Tax), in the interests of 
consistency this paper describes such taxes as VATs. 
 
2. According to Ebrill (2001, p. 4) such a tax was apparently promoted by German businessman von 
Siemans in the 1920s quite independently of Adams while Steinmo (1993, p. 94) highlights the fact that 
Andrew Mellon, Treasury Secretary in the Republican Harding administration, also proposed a national 
consumption tax at this time to cut what was regarded as being prohibitively hight taxes on capital. 
3.  It should be noted that whilst the IMF and the World Bank strongly encouraged and perhaps even 
coerced many developing countries to adopt a VAT, these international organisations have played a less 
significant role in the spread of VATs among advanced industrial countries which are the focus of this 
volume. 
4.  The International Tax Dialogue was established in 1999 and is jointly hosted by the OECD, IMF and 
World Bank < www.itdweb.org>. 
5.  Indeed scholars using an epistemic communities approach – which tends to emphasis the pervasive 
influence of knowledge and shared norms among elites on the policy process – widely recognise 
economic policy as a limiting case in which ideas and political and economic interests shape the policy 
agenda (Ikenberry 1992). 
6.  In an interesting extension to this argument Kato (2003) makes a case that although the deficits of the 
1970s and beyond prompted government to promote the tax reform agenda, the very existence of such 
deficits undermined the political support for reforms generally and new VATs in particular because the 
revenues from these new taxes would repay public debt rather than fund public services. For a critique see 
Ganghof (the article sent to me). 
7. Possible alternatives include a Kaldor Tax or a single-staged Retail Sales Tax (RST). 
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